I had a political theory professor in college who was a strong admirer of Roger Fisher, the Harvard academic who co-authored the landmark book Getting to Yes.

I often find myself wishing more people in government today subscribed to Fisher’s approach. It might lead to more productive talks between the United States and Iran.

Fisher spent his career teaching that successful negotiations are not about winning arguments, but about solving problems. By that standard, what’s happening now between Washington and Tehran is not yet true negotiation. It is something closer to a carefully choreographed standoff.

At the heart of Fisher’s philosophy is a simple but often ignored principle: focus on interests, not positions.

Today, both sides appear locked into rigid positions. The United States continues to press for sweeping limits on Iran’s nuclear program, along with broader constraints on its missile capabilities and regional influence. Iran, meanwhile, is demanding sanctions relief and recognition of its sovereignty before making significant concessions.

Fisher would argue those are surface-level demands. Beneath them lie deeper interests. For the United States, the core concern is preventing a nuclear-armed adversary and maintaining stability in the Middle East. For Iran, the priority is regime survival, economic recovery and maintaining a level of deterrence against its adversaries.

Until those underlying interests are addressed directly, progress will remain elusive.

Just as important in Fisher’s framework is the need to “separate the people from the problem.” That, too, appears to be breaking down. The current talks—often indirect, sometimes publicly denied and conducted through intermediaries—reflect a profound lack of trust. Public rhetoric on both sides only reinforces that divide, making it harder to build the kind of working relationship meaningful negotiation requires.

Another key concept Fisher introduced is the idea of a “BATNA,” or Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. In simple terms, it’s what each side believes it can achieve if talks fail.

Right now, both Washington and Tehran appear to believe their alternatives are strong. The U.S. continues to rely on economic pressure and the implicit threat of military force. Iran, for its part, seems willing to endure sanctions while leveraging its regional influence and waiting for political winds to shift.

That dynamic is a recipe for stalemate. Negotiations rarely succeed when both sides believe they have better options outside the room.

There is also little evidence, at least for now, of what negotiators call a “zone of possible agreement”—the overlap where a deal becomes feasible. The gap between what each side is demanding remains wide, particularly over whether talks should be limited to nuclear issues or expanded to include missiles and regional activities.

So what would Fisher recommend?

First, reframing the problem—not as a contest of demands, but as a shared challenge: how to provide security for both sides without escalating conflict.

Second, a step-by-step approach built on reciprocity. Small, verifiable actions—matched by corresponding concessions—can gradually build trust where none currently exists.

Third, the use of objective standards, such as international inspections and clearly defined benchmarks, to move discussions away from politics and toward measurable outcomes.

Finally, and perhaps most difficult, reducing the kind of public posturing that often undermines private diplomacy. Negotiations conducted for domestic audiences rarely produce lasting agreements.

From Fisher’s perspective, the current U.S.–Iran “dance” is not unusual. It is what happens when mistrust is high, stakes are enormous and both sides are reluctant to appear weak.

But it also carries a warning.

Until the focus shifts from positions to problem-solving, what looks like negotiation will remain something else entirely—a prolonged and potentially dangerous stalemate.